President Lee Jae Myung (left) and first lady Kim Hea Kyung arrive at the Beijing Capital International Airport in Beijing on Sunday to begin Lee's four-day state visit to China. (Yonhap)


President Lee Jae Myung’s four-day state visit to China is less a deal-making summit than an e 바다이야기예시 xploration of how Seoul and Beijing can steady their relationship under the growing constraints of US-China strategic competition and an increasingly volatile regional security landscape.
Th 모바일바다이야기 e trip, which began Sunday, carries a twin imperative, observers say. One is to keep high-stakes flashpoints from hijacking the relationship — as the 2017 THAAD deployment did.
The other, eq 게임몰릴게임 ually critical imperative is to carve out lanes of economic cooperation durable enough to withstand strategic pressure, alongside cultural and people-to-people exchanges that can shore up the fragile 체리마스터pc용다운로드 foundations of bilateral ties.
In Beijing on Monday, Lee’s agenda with President Xi Jinping will be shaped less by easy deliverables than by the region’s hard-security flashpoints. Pyongyang 바다이야기오리지널 ’s apparent ballistic missile launches hours before Lee’s departure only sharpened the backdrop.
Seoul’s effort to enlist China in its efforts to curb North Korea’s missile and nuclear program is expected to feature prominently, alongside the Taiwan issue, the modernization of the Korea-US alliance, Seoul’s push for nuclear-powered submarines, and Beijing’s contested structures in the West Sea.
The timing of the meeting — the second in roughly two months — suggests both sides see value in restoring a leader-level rhythm. Yet it also works against Seoul, tightening the constraints on an already delicate balancing act.
As China-Japan tensions over Taiwan rise, sharpened by remarks from Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on potential military mobilization, Beijing has already begun stepping up pressure on Seoul.
In its readout of a phone call between South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Wang urged Seoul to maintain a “responsible attitude toward history and the people,” including adherence to the one-China principle on Taiwan.

Guardrails over outcomes

With the geopolitical space shrinking, experts underscored that Seoul’s primary goal is not new outcomes, but to put a floor under the Seoul-Beijing relationship to prevent a rupture.
Chung Jae-hung, a senior fellow at the Center for Diplomatic Strategy at the Sejong Institute, underscored the salience of Lee’s state visit at a juncture where Seoul lacks the leverage to dictate terms on the region’s most complex challenges, while facing the growing risks of aligning too exclusively with the US and Japan.
"Whether it is the North Korean issue, China-Japan tensions, or US-China relations, there is simply not much diplomatic space for us to maneuver or force a specific outcome right now," Chung told The Korea Herald. "Instead, we should focus on the inherent value of building a friendly relationship with China to ensure these issues do not inflict damage on our foreign policy."
Kim Heung-kyu, founder of the US-China Policy Institute and a professor of political science at Ajou University, described this stance as the operational bottom line for the Lee administration’s foreign policy.
"Realistically, it is difficult to abandon the Korea-US alliance or our US-leaning diplomatic stance," Kim said. "However, entering into an adversarial relationship with China is our red line. Declaring clearly that we will not cross that threshold — that is the bottom line of Korean foreign policy. Every other issue, including Taiwan, must be worked out on that premise."

Taiwan tests Seoul’s guardrails

The most immediate test of this bottom line is Taiwan.
The consensus among experts is that the Lee administration must handle the issue with calibrated language: acknowledging the one-China policy as agreed in the 1992 diplomatic normalization, while drawing a clear boundary around South Korea’s own national interests.
“We have recognized the one-China policy — and even the United States has recognized it — so this is not a matter in which we should intervene,” Kim said. “The principle of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait is in fact a core national interest for us. We should be vocal in affirming the principle of freedom of navigation."
South Korea’s interests also become non-negotiable if the cross-strait issue shifts from diplomacy to force.
“If cross-strait issues are resolved through military confrontation or the use of force, then for a divided country like South Korea — and a trading state — it directly affects our absolute national interests and our security,” Kim added. “That is why South Korea should state clearly that it supports a peaceful resolution across the Taiwan Strait and peaceful unification.”

Managing risk, not resolution

Beyond Taiwan, other sensitive security files — such as the modernization of the Korea–US alliance, Seoul’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines, and Beijing’s contested structures in the West Sea — pose a similar dilemma.
Because fundamental differences exist, any of these could sharply change the temperature of the relationship.
Moon Heung-ho, a professor emeritus at Hanyang University’s Graduate School of International Studies, expects Beijing to raise the Taiwan issue explicitly through the lens of Korea-US alliance modernization and trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan.
“In this area, it is in fact impossible for us to fully persuade China. It is more about asking China to understand what the modernization of the Korea-US alliance actually entails," Moon told The Korea Herald. “The alliance issue is a priority for discussion. But success here is less about producing a concrete outcome than about widening shared understanding and urging greater mutual comprehension.”
Given these unbridgeable gaps, the prevailing assessment is that Seoul’s goal is not to resolve these issues, but to prevent them from causing a rupture.
“What matters is issue management — ensuring these issues do not go on to worsen Korea-China relations,” Chung said. “It is an excessive expectation to think they will be resolved at this summit — that itself is an overly high bar.”

Reframing China’s North Korea calculus

North Korea’s nuclear program presents an even more complex challenge, particularly as the Lee administration hopes to induce China to take up a constructive role ahead of US President Donald Trump’s planned trip to China in April.
However, China’s willingness to pressure Pyongyang to return to nuclear negotiations is in question, as it seeks to mend its own ties with North Korea.
Kim Heung-kyu warned against overinvesting in this track.
“If we become too attached to this issue, we may end up receiving lip service on matters China cannot deliver,” Kim said. “Realistically, it is not an area where we can expect much practical benefit.”
Yet, the Lee administration can approach this constraint from a different angle. Instead of expecting direct support, Moon suggested Seoul should reframe the issue to show China that inaction is strategically costly — potentially triggering a "proliferation domino" in the Indo-Pacific region.
“From China’s standpoint, if it wants to block a nuclear proliferation domino — and stop it on the Korean Peninsula — it should not avoid mentioning denuclearization,” Moon said. “We should propose that China not extinguish this issue, but keep the embers alive.”

Cultural openings

Where, then, can results be found — especially with a short preparation window and so many security files constrained by structural realities?
“Substantively, the most important discussions are about security,” Moon said. “But any results will inevitably have to come in the economic and people-to-people realms.”
Despite structural constraints, cultural exchanges and narrowly defined economic cooperation are seen as the few areas where Seoul and Beijing can show tangible progress during Lee’s state visit.
Hwang Jae-ho, a professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, pointed to people-to-people and cultural exchanges as politically viable deliverables, noting that mutual animosity has become particularly pronounced among younger generations in both countries.
“As for what is often called the ‘Hallyu ban,’ China doesn’t officially acknowledge it. But some degree of opening in the cultural sphere — greater access for Korean culture — could be where they try to show progress this time," Hwang said. “Because the summit is coming so soon after the last one, measures to expand cultural exchanges may be the most feasible place to demonstrate results.”
Even there, analysts caution against inflated expectations. Under Xi, China has tightened controls on external cultural influence, viewing the influx of foreign content through a lens of national security.
"I think we will see some opening in areas like tourism, cosmetics, and duty-free sales," Chung said. "However, expecting a complete lifting of the ban is setting the bar too high. As is well known, China is currently tightening its internal controls on Western culture, which directly affects sectors like drama, film, and entertainment."

Hunting for economic niches

It is in the economic realm, however, that the most consequential — and technically fraught — diplomacy must be engineered.
While the agenda formally includes the second phase of the Korea–China Free Trade Agreement, the presence of a 200-member business delegation betrays a more granular level of ambition: carving out industrial niches capable of surviving the intense friction of US-China strategic competition.
“With company leaders included, the goal is to identify niche areas of cooperation under the umbrella of economic security — specifically those that Washington would not object to,” Hwang said. "Just as the US and China are seeking economic common ground despite their political and security standoffs, we will likely follow a similar model — looking for niche areas of cooperation between Korea and China."
Choo Jae-woo, a professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyung Hee University, emphasized that the visit is crucial for gauging Beijing's stance firsthand, a necessary step to finding workable areas for industrial cooperation.
“China seeks industrial cooperation, but US regulations remain the primary obstacle. Right now, Washington and Beijing are heavily debating these regulations in their tariff negotiations,” Choo said.
“Until now, we have relied solely on the US narrative regarding these talks. It is crucial to hear China’s perspective on how these negotiations are evolving, and then identify opportunities for industrial cooperation that do not cross US regulatory lines.”
Ultimately, the benchmark for success is specificity rather than rhetoric.
Kim Heung-kyu noted that while South Korea’s deep integration with the US in strategic sectors like semiconductors limits the scope for compromise, Seoul should still pursue "forward-looking" collaboration in emerging fields such as biotechnology and AI.
"Practically speaking, the most realistic benefit we can secure is economic cooperation," Kim said.
However, Kim stressed that the ball is now in Beijing’s court, as Seoul has few remaining economic cards to play. The test of this second summit will be whether Xi offers concrete mechanisms for action or retreats to familiar platitudes.
“If, through this summit, the Chinese side brings forward either a concrete institutional mechanism for cooperation or specific areas of cooperation, that would count as an achievement,” Kim said. “But if it stops at general, principle-level talk, it would be hard to judge Korea–China relations — and this summit in particular — as a major success.”